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Previous studies disagree about whether open market repurchase announcements contain 
information about earnings expectations. Using a regulation that made tax haven-using 
firms’ repurchases more costly as a quasi-natural experiment, I find positive post-
repurchase-announcement revisions in earnings expectations for firms using “Double 
Irish” offshore tax avoidance structures. These results are robust to falsification tests, 
different types of tax havens, and changes in forecasted and actual earnings. “Double 
Irish” firms announce fewer repurchase programs than other firms after the regulation, 
consistent with an increase in their repurchasing costs. These results suggest that certain 














Open market repurchases (hereafter “OMRs”), where firm managers announce their 
intention to buy back a portion of publicly traded firm shares at market prices, are perhaps 
the most popular modern payout method in the U.S. (Grullon and Michaely (2004), Skinner 
(2008)). This study investigates whether announcements of OMR programs contain new 
information about earnings expectations. I examine this question using a 2007 regulatory 
change (novel to payout policy studies, to the best of my knowledge) that affected certain 
firms’ repurchase costs and therefore plausibly altered their repurchase motivations and 
decisions. 
While many theorists have suggested a link between firm payouts and favorable 
earnings information conveyed by the payouts, especially in payouts that are costly for 
firms, past empirical studies of OMR announcements have found conflicting results.1 
Using changes in repurchaser earnings (adjusted for changes in matched, non-repurchaser 
earnings) as a proxy for earnings expectations, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) and 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find inconclusive results, while Lie (2005) and Billett and 
Yu (forthcoming) find evidence of average post-announcement operating improvements in 
certain subsamples of firms. However, Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) show that some post-
OMR-announcement operating improvements may result from downward earnings 
management preceding the announcement. 
Relatively fewer studies have examined earnings forecast revisions after OMR 
announcements. To the extent that analyst forecasts are informative about actual future 
earnings, forecast revisions represent an appealing alternative proxy for changes in 
                                                          
1 Studies that propose earnings signaling models of payouts include Bhattacharya (1979), Vermaelen (1981), 
John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), and Ofer and Thakor (1987). 
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earnings expectations. For example, Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009) 
discuss how forecast revisions are unaffected by survivorship bias and future earnings- 
influencing events. Analysts also remove impacts from earnings management to provide 
their clients with more useful information (Louis, Sun, and Urcan (2013)). Interestingly, 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), Grullon and Michaely (2004), and Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009) all find evidence of downward average earnings per share (EPS) forecast revisions 
after OMR announcements. These results suggest either that OMR announcements convey 
information about worse-than-expected earnings or that managers are timing these OMR 
announcements exceptionally poorly.2 
I begin by offering an explanation for these counterintuitive results. I find that the 
evidence of negative average forecast revisions in past studies was likely the result of either 
1) an overall downward bias in earnings forecast revisions across all firms (as documented 
by O'Brien (1988) and Brous (1992)) or 2) forecast bias-correction procedures that 
inadvertently introduced new biases. Using a novel measure of forecast revisions that 
adjusts for these biases, I find no evidence of downward revisions in earnings expectations, 
on average, in a 28-year sample of OMR announcements. 
Next, I identify open market repurchase programs that are likely to be costly for 
firms and test whether these repurchase program announcements contain information about 
earnings expectations. My tests of these OMR announcements utilize a quasi-natural 
experiment: an unexpected legislative shock related to the practice of using pre-tax 
corporate profits stored in overseas tax havens for repurchases. Traditionally, domestic tax 
payments on overseas cash holdings were delayed until the money was “repatriated” back 
to the U.S. However, some firms avoided these repatriation-related taxes by initiating 
repurchase programs through their foreign subsidiaries, returning the funds directly to 
shareholders without paying U.S. taxes. In reaction to this, in May 2007 the IRS issued 
Notice 2007-48, which prevented U.S. firms from continuing this practice.3 This forced tax 
                                                          
2 While Bartov (1991) finds evidence of positive earnings information using forecast revisions after OMR 
announcements, the sample used is small and the author himself suggests that the overall evidence consistent 
with earnings signals conveyed by the announcements is weak. 
3 Johnston, David Cay, “I.R.S. Moves to Close Tax Shelter Shortly After I.B.M. Uses It to Save $1.6 




haven-using firms to fund repurchases by repatriating and paying taxes on offshore, 
untaxed profits or using other cash sources (new debt, domestic cash reserves, etc.) that 
would constrain the firms from maximizing future offshore profit transfers. 
My tests focus on firms using a complex and effective method of tax avoidance 
called the “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich.” In this method, U.S. firms use an Irish 
subsidiary to store firm patents; pre-tax profits are then diverted to this Irish subsidiary as 
“patent royalties.” Other foreign subsidiaries are used to avoid further taxation from Irish 
tax authorities. By closing the repurchase-based repatriation “loophole” described above, 
the 2007 regulation increased the cost of repurchasing for these firms. I hypothesize that a 
firm’s willingness to bear these repurchase-related costs may indicate that outsiders are 
underestimating the firm’s future earnings. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that average post-OMR-announcement 
earnings expectation revisions are positive for firms likely to be using the “Double Irish” 
technique, but only after the IRS reform. In difference-in-difference tests, I also find a 
significantly higher change in “Double Irish” firms’ post-OMR-announcement revisions 
(compared with other firms’ post-OMR-announcement revisions) from before to after the 
regulation. I also use triple difference specification that compare this difference-in-
difference measure to the same measure in non-OMR-announcing periods. This 
specification is a falsification test designed to mitigate the possibility that the significantly 
higher forecast revisions found in “Double Irish” firms after the regulation are present in 
all monthly observations for these firms (rather than just after repurchase announcements). 
These tests find that the difference-in-difference results are specific only to periods after 
an OMR is announced. Importantly, these results are robust to both bias-adjusted and 
unadjusted measures of forecast revisions. I also find evidence of positive earnings 
information in a larger sample of firms with a subsidiary in any country classified as a tax 
haven. 
Other test results are consistent with the IRS reform impacting the likelihood of 
initiating OMR programs. As would be expected with a higher cost of repurchasing, 
“Double Irish” firms announce fewer programs (compared with other firms) after the 
regulation. Additional tests using propensity score matched changes in actual earnings 
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produce similar results and inferences to tests of forecasted earnings. Finally, results in the 
key forecast revision tests cannot be explained by any “accretive” effects of repurchasing 
(i.e. mechanical increases in EPS increases resulting from a diminished number of shares 
outstanding). Taken together, these results suggest that firms with costly repurchases may 
announce OMR programs when earnings are underestimated by outsiders. 
This study contributes to a number of areas of finance literature. I construct a novel 
measure of analyst forecast revisions that provides an explanation for the negative average 
revisions found in past OMR studies. I also find evidence of positive earnings revisions in 
subsamples of OMR-announcing firms using a unique shock to repurchase costs. To my 
knowledge, this is the first OMR study to provide evidence of both positive forecasted and 
actual earnings changes in any subsample of repurchase-announcing firms, the first to 
provide evidence of the link between costs and signals found in traditional signaling 
models, and the first to utilize this particular legislative shock. This paper also adds an 
important facet to our understanding of the use of tax havens by U.S. firms: if a firm is 
keeping untaxed profits offshore, OMR program announcements may be not only less 
frequent than expected but also an indication of better-than-expected future earnings. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews payout policy literature and 
repurchase hypotheses. Section II discusses data and variables used in the paper. Section 








The traditional signaling hypothesis for payouts relies on information asymmetries 
that cause insiders and outsiders to value a firm differently. Under this hypothesis, firm 
managers who believe that outsiders are undervaluing the firm explicitly provide a positive 
signal about better-than-expected upcoming earnings by initiating a new payout to 
shareholders. Closely related is the undervaluation hypothesis, where managers perceive 
the firm’s shares to be undervalued for rational (i.e. asymmetric information-based) and/or 
irrational (i.e. market sentiment-based) reasons. Both hypotheses suggest that managers 
value the firm more highly than outsiders, but this valuation difference is not necessarily 
based on earnings expectations in the undervaluation hypothesis. Although a number of 
studies find evidence of improved earnings following tender offers (Vermaelen (1981), 
Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991), and McConnell and Lie (1998)), the evidence using 
OMR announcements is more mixed, as discussed in the introduction. 
What do signaling explanations for repurchases actually predict? Consider the 
following simple model of firm valuation, adapted from Modigliani and Miller (1966): 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 = 𝑃𝑉(𝐸[𝐶𝐹𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒]) + 𝑃𝑉(𝐸[𝐶𝐹𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠])           (1) 
The market’s valuation of a firm is the sum of the present values of two sources of expected 
cash flows. The first source is cash flows from the firm’s assets in place (i.e. cash flows 
from current operations), while the second source is cash flows from growth opportunities. 
(Similar models are used in payout studies by Miller and Rock (1985) and Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989).) 
Signaling explanations concern the first source of expected cash flows in equation 
(1). Although payouts in signaling models are costly for the firm, the new information 
signaled about cash flows from assets in place results in an overall increase in the market’s 
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valuation of the firm. While the traditional signaling hypothesis has been discounted in 
practitioner surveys (Brav et al. (2005)) and even in studies that find evidence of positive   
post-OMR announcement changes in earnings (Lie (2005)), the more general 
undervaluation hypothesis has found greater support. For example, Brav et al. (2005) note 
that practitioners associate both undervaluation and earnings information with 
repurchases.4 More formally, the main prediction of both signaling explanations and an 
earnings-related undervaluation story can be expressed as a testable hypothesis: If OMR 
announcements convey positive information about earnings, there should be upward 
revisions in expected cash flows from assets in place (on average) after those 
announcements. 
This prediction is unique to these two repurchase explanations. For example, the 
free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen (1986)) suggests that if managers don’t always work in 
the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), increasing payouts to 
shareholders using the firm’s excess cash will reduce a managers’ ability to invest in value-
destroying projects. However, to my knowledge no studies argue that these types of 
payouts should be followed by increases in cash flows from assets in place; they should 
instead affect either expected longer-term cash flows from growth opportunities (by 
removing the cash that enables sub-optimal investments) or affect the discount rates 
applied to future cash flows by signaling a decrease in a firm’s systematic risk (leaving 
undiscounted earnings expectations unchanged). Other payout explanations do not link the 
OMR announcements themselves to increases in expected cash flows from assets in place.5 
Although many repurchase studies use stock returns in their tests, positive post-
announcement returns do not necessarily indicate an upward revision in cash flows from 
assets in place, nor is this result uniquely attributable to signaling or earnings-related 
                                                          
4 More specifically, three of the top five motivations for repurchases listed in Brav et al. (2005) are “market 
price of our stock (if our stock is a good investment, relative to its true value)”, “stability of future earnings” 
and “(a) sustainable change in earnings.” 
5 Other explanations specific to OMRs include defense against takeovers (Bagnoli et al. (1989), Bagwell 
(1991), and Billett and Xue (2007)), altering leverage ratios (Dittmar (2000)), substitution for dividend 
payments (Grullon and Michaely (2002)), fulfilling executive stock option grants and preventing dilution 
(Kahle (2002)), a desire to reverse the negative stock price effects of a competitor’s repurchase announcement 
(Massa et al. (2007)), CEO opportunism (Griffin and Zhu (2010)), a desire to mislead investors (Chan et al. 
(2010)), and a reaction to diminished product market threats (Hoberg, Phillips, and Prahbala (2014)). 
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undervaluation explanations.6 For example, a repurchase motivated by overinvestment 
concerns would result in a stock price increase without altering expectations about cash 
flows from assets in place. In unreported tests I find significantly positive [-1,+2] day 
announcement returns using a variety of cumulative return measures (raw, market-
adjusted, and Fama-French (1993) risk-factor adjusted) in every subsample of OMR 
announcements examined in this study. Rather than further examine stock returns, I instead 
follow previous studies (Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), Grullon and Michaely (2004)) 
that use both near-term earnings and earnings forecasts as proxies for cash flows from 
assets in place. 
                                                          
6 Many studies find stock price improvements after tender offers (Vermaelen (1984), Comment and Jarrell 
(1991), D’Mello and Shroff (2000), and Louis and White (2007)) and OMRs and OMR announcements 
(Ikenberry et al. (1995), Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009), Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2012), Billett and Yu (forthcoming), and Dittmar 
and Field (forthcoming)). 
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III.A. Analyst Forecast Data and Construction of the Key Forecast Revision Variable 
Data on U.S. OMR announcements are obtained from the Securities Data 
Corporation’s Mergers and Acquisitions database. I follow Grullon and Michaely (2004) 
and drop observations where dividends were decreased prior to the announcement (within 
four quarters), since these repurchases may simply substitute for existing dividends 
(Grullon and Michaely (2002)). The resulting sample contains 13,506 OMR 
announcements from 1984-2011. 
Monthly split-adjusted data on earnings forecasts are obtained from the I/B/E/S 
summary file. Due to some implausibly large positive and negative forecast revisions in 
the data, all I/B/E/S earnings forecast revisions are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Additionally, all stocks with a lagged monthly price of less than $1 are dropped from the 
sample.7 I obtain data for seven forecast periods available in I/B/E/S: the next four quarters 
(including the current quarter) and three years (including the current year). Following 
Grullon and Michaely (2004), I define “Abnormal Forecast Revisions” (AFR) as follows: 
 𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡).                                             (2) 
FR is the median revision in earnings per share (EPS) for firm i in month t, scaled by the 
lagged monthly stock price of the firm. Price scaling is used to reduce measurement error 
in the forecasts (Christie (1987)). Since AFR typically has between two and four zeroes 
after the decimal point, I scale up all AFR measures in the tables by a factor of 1,000 to 
make the results easier to read. 
E(FR) is a firm’s “expected” revision in EPS. In their study, Grullon and Michaely 
(2004) define E(FR) as the average of nearly all available forecast revisions across time for 
                                                          




a firm. Using this method, each firm has a unique E(FR) based on their past and future 
forecast revisions. Brous and Kini (1993) originally used this technique in an attempt to 
control for an observed correlation between forecast optimism bias and firm size.8 
However, the forecast revisions for each firm over time are likely to reflect not only 
any bias related to firm size but also the actual performance of that firm over time. 
Historically successful firms should be expected to have more positive forecast revisions 
over time, as analysts are likely to adjust future earnings expectations upward in response 
to firm success. Ceteris paribus, these firms would have higher average forecast revisions 
over time than other firms. Successful firms are also more likely to become large firms, in 
the same way that mutual fund size is linked to past success (Berk and Green (2004)). This 
raises concerns that the construction of E(FR) described above would result in downward-
biased AFRs in historically profitable firms. This in turn might lead to incorrect inferences 
in OMR studies, especially if OMR-announcing firms are more historically “successful” 
in general. 
I address this concern by quantifying this size-correlated bias and defining E(FR) 
only in terms of this bias and the remaining “optimism bias” common to all firms (O'Brien 
(1988) and Brous (1992)). First, I estimate the following OLS regression in the full I/B/E/S 
database: 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡.       (3) 
The dependent variable AvgHistRevision is the average of all price-scaled median forecast 
revisions for firm i over its entire I/B/E/S listing period. (This is a close analog of Grullon 
and Michaely’s E(FR)). The regression decomposes this measure into a size-related 
component and a performance-related component. In equation (3), RankSize is the 
percentile rank of firm i’s size (in assets) among all Compustat-listed firms in a particular 
quarter. Based on the results in Brous and Kini (1993), I expect RankSize to be positively 
related to AvgHistRevision. UpwardEPS is the fraction of firm i’s year-over-year actual 
                                                          
8 The source of this size-related bias is unclear. Gu and Wu (2003) suggest that analysts have strong incentives 
to issue optimistic initial forecasts for small firms in order to gain access to managers in those firms. This 
implies that firm size is not directly related to forecast revisions, but instead proxies for analysts using 




EPS changes over its entire I/B/E/S listing period that are EPS increases. This measure is 
designed to capture how often each firm is growing or shrinking in EPS. I expect 
UpwardEPS to be positively related to AvgHistRevision, since analyst forecast revisions 
should, to some extent, reflect the actual performance of the firm over time. The percentile 
measure RankSize is input into the regressions as its decimal equivalent in order to make 
the coefficient values more comparable to UpwardEPS (both variables now take on 
continuous values between 0 and 1). I use observations with at least 20 monthly I/B/E/S 
updates in the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The coefficients generated by these regressions are shown in Table 1. Both 
RankSize and UpwardEPS are positive and highly significant in all regressions.  
Importantly, the coefficients and t-statistics on UpwardEPS are much larger than those on 
RankSize. This suggests that historical revisions are more strongly correlated with firm 
performance over time than firm size. 
 
Table 1: Forecast Bias Estimation Regressions 
Caption: This table presents the coefficients and t-statistics from the following OLS 
regression: 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
AvgHistRevision is the average price-scaled median forecast revision for firm i over its 
entire I/B/E/S listing period.  This variable is scaled up by 1,000 in order to make the 
resulting coefficient estimates more readable.  RankSize is the percentile rank of firm i’s 
size (in assets) compared to all other Compustat-listed firms in quarter t and is input into 
the regressions as its decimal equivalent (i.e. values between 0 and 1) in order to make the 
coefficient values more comparable to UpwardEPS.  UpwardEPS is the fraction of year-
over-year increases in firm i’s actual EPS (relative to total year-over-year EPS changes) 
over its I/B/E/S listing period.  To reduce noise, firms with fewer than 20 I/B/E/S monthly 
forecast updates are dropped prior to the OLS estimation.  Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. "Time period" refers to the I/B/E/S forecast period used for each forecast 
measure ("Quarter + 0" refers to the forecast of the current fiscal quarter as of the time of 
the repurchase announcement, "Quarter + 1" refers to the forecast of the next fiscal quarter, 
and so on).  Median analyst forecast revisions for the entire I/B/E/S database are trimmed 
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at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  ***, ** and * indicate significance of the OLS coefficients 





Next, I use the estimated 𝛽1 coefficients from equation (3) and each observation’s 
RankSize to generate fitted values for each firm’s expected forecast revisions (E(FR)): 
𝐸(𝐹𝑅)𝑖,𝑡  =  ?̂?1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙.                                            (4) 
Each term in equation (4) addresses a key source of forecast bias: the ?̂?1 term addresses 
bias that is correlated with firm size, while 𝜙 (a number chosen to set mean AFR across a 
particular forecast measure and sample equal to zero) addresses forecast optimism bias that 
is common to all firms. My expected revisions thus vary based on firm size, but not a firm’s 
past and future performance. 
Table 2 presents mean AFRs following OMR announcements, mean AFRs for all 
other I/B/E/S listed firms in all periods, and the difference in mean AFRs between these 
two groups. To see how my novel AFR measure produces different results than past 
studies, each panel computes AFR using a different definition of E(FR). Panel A presents 
the results using E(FR) = 0 (i.e. no bias adjustments, as in Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) 
and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), Panel B uses the definition of E(FR) based on each 
firm’s past and future average revisions (as in Grullon and Michaely (2004)), and Panel C 
sets E(FR) equal to the result of equation (4) above. 
 At first glance, the negative repurchaser mean AFRs in Panel A suggest that 
unfavorable information is conveyed by OMR announcements. However, mean AFRs are 
Time period coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat
Quarter + 0 -1.83 *** -21.37 0.31 *** 5.54 2.04 *** 15.50
Quarter + 1 -2.26 *** -18.59 0.58 *** 7.06 2.29 *** 11.99
Quarter + 2 -1.49 *** -14.47 0.40 *** 7.43 1.47 *** 9.15
Quarter + 3 -1.11 *** -11.86 0.31 *** 5.99 1.09 *** 7.18
Year + 0 -6.71 *** -27.57 2.12 *** 13.65 6.91 *** 18.54
Year + 1 -6.27 *** -22.35 1.66 *** 9.35 6.34 *** 14.00
Year + 2 -6.01 *** -7.13 1.13 *** 2.77 6.47 *** 5.39
Intercept (alpha) RankSize UpwardEPS
12 
  
also negative across all other I/B/E/S observations, and the mean differences between these 
two groups are generally insignificantly different from zero. With this additional context, 
it no longer appears that OMR announcements specifically convey negative information 
(on average) about earnings. These results also clearly illustrate the downward bias present 
in unadjusted forecast revisions. In Panel B, most mean AFR measures are significantly 
negative for the repurchasers (as expected, given the results in Grullon and Michaely 
(2004)) but not in the remaining I/B/E/S sample. It is yet unclear whether the negative 
average AFRs for repurchasers are the result of negative information about earnings or the 
























Table 2: Full Sample Univariate Tests of Abnormal Forecast Revisions 
Caption: The variables of interest are the Abnormal Forecast Revisions for repurchasing 
firms from 1984-2011, where an Abnormal Forecast Revision is defined as the change in 
median forecasted earnings per share (scaled by lagged firm price) minus the "expected 
change" in the analyst earnings per share forecast. All abnormal forecast revisions are 
scaled up by 1,000.  In Panel A, the "expected change" is equal to zero.  In Panel B, the 
expected change is defined as the average median revision in forecasted earnings-per-share 
for firm i (scaled by each firm's lagged price) for all time periods outside of the six months 
before and after the update period.  In Panel C, the expected change is equal to the result 
of equation (4) in this paper: 𝐸(𝐹𝑅)𝑖,𝑡  =  ?̂?1𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜙 (where ?̂?1 was obtained from 
the regressions in equation (3) and 𝜙 is a number chosen to set the mean Abnormal Forecast 
Revisions equal to zero across a particular forecast measure and sample). All earnings-per-
share forecast information is obtained from I/B/E/S.  Median analyst forecasts for the entire 
I/B/E/S database are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles prior to the construction of the 
Abnormal Forecast Revision variable, and all observations with a lagged stock price of less 
than $1 are dropped.  "Time period" for the I/B/E/S forecast measures is defined in Table 
1.  The first group of columns reports data on Abnormal Forecast Revisions following 
update periods when firms make open market repurchase announcements during the 1984-
2011 sample period, the second group of columns reports data on Abnormal Forecast 
Revisions for all other I/B/E/S observations (when an open market repurchase is not 
announced) during the 1984-2011 sample period, and the third column reports the 
difference in means between these two groups. ***, ** and * indicate significance using 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To help answer this question, Panel C presents results using the new AFR measure 
constructed in equations (2)-(4) above. The average revisions found in non-OMR-
announcing firms in this panel are essentially zero (as expected, since equation (4) is 
designed to set sample-wide mean AFRs equal to zero). However, the revisions in OMR-
announcing firms are also generally insignificantly different from zero. These results 
suggest that no positive or negative information about earnings is conveyed by the average 
announcement. 
The AFR measures used in panels A through C illustrate how the use of different 
forecast revision measures can change perceptions of OMR announcements. Later tests 
will examine whether earnings information is found in certain, specific firms where 
repurchase motivations may be altered by an unanticipated legislative shock. 
III.B. Accounting and Economic Expectations Data 
I obtain quarterly accounting data from Compustat and match this data to the 
monthly I/B/E/S observations. I construct proxies for firm valuation (Average Q), dividend 
payments (DivPayer, equal to 1 if a firm paid a dividend in the prior quarter), firm size 
(LnAssets), profitability levels (Return on Cash-Adjusted Assets, or ROCAA), profitability 
trends (the quarter-over-quarter change in ROCAA, or ROCAA change), cash holdings 
(Cash/Assets), capital structure (DebtRatio), capital expenditures (ScaledCapEx), and the 
portion of equity from retained earnings (RE/TE). These or similar variables have been 
used in past studies of payout policy. Since an Average Q of less than one has proxied for 
payout motivations in previous studies (Lang and Litzenberger (1989)), I use two valuation 
variables in multiple regression tests: a version of Average Q where values of Q below one 
are set equal to one, and Average Q < 1, an indicator variable equal to one when Average 
Q is below one. All non-indicator variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
and typically lagged by one quarter in tests. More details on the construction of these 
variables (and all others used in this study) are found in the appendix. 
ROCAA is also used as an alternative proxy for post-OMR earnings in later tests. 
The cash-adjusted denominator ensures that the decrease in cash from actual share 
repurchases does not mechanically generate an increase in this measure. Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) and Lie (2005) use similar proxies, and Grullon and Michaely (2004) 
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discuss the merits of this proxy due to its insensitivity to changes in capital structure, 
depreciation, and extraordinary items. 
Since earnings forecasts are affected by economic conditions, I also construct a 
variable that proxies for current economic expectations using the monthly Smoothed U.S. 
Recession Probability, available from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED) 
website.9 Any missing observations in the ALFRED database are assumed to have the 
previous month’s recession probability. I create an indicator variable named Decline, 
which is equal to one when the recession probability is 10% or greater, as a proxy for 
periods when there is a non-trivial chance that the economy will enter a period of decline. 
(The correlation of this measure with NBER “decline from economic peak” months is 0.90 
over my sample period, so this measure proxies well for actual macroeconomic 
information.) Since this measure is released on a two-month lag, I lag all Smoothed U.S. 
Recession Probabilities by two months in the construction of Decline. 
Table 3 provides the mean and median values of the quarterly accounting variables. 
The first two columns present key firm characteristics for the OMR-announcing 
observations and all firm-quarter observations in Compustat from 1984-2011 where an 
announcement did not occur. OMR-announcing firms tend to be larger than other firms, so 
their forecast revisions should have a relatively smaller amount of “size-related bias”. 
However, OMR-announcing firms are also substantially more profitable (mean and median 





                                                          
9 http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series?seid=RECPROUSM156N. Additional details about this variable were 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The fourth and fifth columns divide the repurchase observations with available 
I/B/E/S data into two categories: observations where a firm’s quarterly earnings 
announcement (EA) does not occur during the same forecast update period as the 
repurchase announcement, and observations where an EA does occur during the update 
period. For subsequent tests of forecast revisions, I use only the observations that occur 
during forecast update periods without a contemporaneous earnings announcement. These 
observations make up more than half of my total sample with I/B/E/S data, and the “with 
EA” and “without EA” groups appear more closely matched in terms of most firm 
characteristics. 
I focus on this subsample for two reasons. First, when an earnings announcement 
occurs during the same forecast update period as a repurchase announcement, it is difficult 
to determine how much of the subsequent forecast revision to attribute to each event. For 
example, if some firms announce repurchase plans near relatively poor earnings releases, 
this might bias tests against finding evidence consistent with positive earnings information. 
(Consistent with this idea, in unreported tests I find that the mean and median changes in 
ROCAA are significantly negative in both the “with EA” and “without EA” subsamples.) 
Second, if any evidence of earnings information in OMR announcements exists, it should 
be easier to detect during the relatively less volatile periods when no new earnings 




                                                          
10 In unreported tests, I find that the sample variance for AFR is between 1.5 and 4.3 times higher for the 
“with EA” subsample than the “without EA” subsample (depending on the AFR timeframe used). 
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IV.A. Description of the Shock 
Suppose an unanticipated shock were to generate higher costs associated with 
repurchases without affecting other factors that might influence earnings expectations 
(such as operating performance or investment choices). This shock would be exogenous, 
in the sense that it would affect earnings forecast revisions only through its effect on OMR 
announcements. Suppose further that outsiders believed that the firm would actually incur 
this cost after an OMR announcement by following through with actual repurchases. With 
both a cost and a commitment to the repurchase, earnings-based undervaluation 
explanations and signaling models would predict positive revisions in earnings 
expectations for these firms. If these explanations were not valid, we would expect no 
revisions (or even negative revisions, given the increased costs associated with the 
repurchases). 
With this in mind, I propose that the May 2007 IRS regulation (Notice 2007-48) 
described in the introduction fits the structure of the shock described above. Prior to the 
passage of this regulation, many tax haven-using firms were believed to have repurchased 
shares in a way that circumvented paying taxes on the offshore-stored cash used for the 
repurchases.11 However, after the regulation’s passage, U.S. firms funding repurchases 
using offshore, untaxed profits were required to repatriate and pay the taxes due on those 
profits. Alternatively, these repurchases could be funded by taking on debt or using 
                                                          
11 “I.B.M. used a foreign subsidiary to buy back shares through foreign exchanges. The subsidiary then used 
the shares to pay its corporate parent in America for goods and services…this technique was believed to be 
in wide use by corporations that have substantial profits offshore and are also buying back large amounts of 
their own shares to return value to investors.” Johnston, David Cay, “I.R.S. Moves to Close Tax Shelter 
Shortly After I.B.M. Uses It to Save $1.6 Billion”, The New York Times June 2007. 
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domestically held cash, but this would be likely to constrain the repurchasers in other ways. 
For example, future profits that might otherwise have been transferred to offshore havens 
will instead go towards paying debt service or replenishing domestic cash reserves.12 There 
is no evidence that this regulation was anticipated by U.S. firms; by all accounts, the 
regulation’s creation was prompted by an IBM repurchase announced just two days before 
Notice 2007-48 was released.13 This regulation creates an ideal setting for tests, since it 
should affect repurchasing firms in a heterogeneous fashion (as repurchase costs and 
decisions should only be altered in firms using tax havens).  
Among all tax avoidance techniques, arguably the most effective is the “Double 
Irish with a Dutch sandwich” corporate subsidiary structure that allow U.S. corporations 
to significantly delay or reduce U.S. tax payments on corporate profits. To use these 
structures, firm managers set up an Irish subsidiary that will own the intellectual property 
(IP) for key company products. This subsidiary then licenses the IP to the corporate parent 
and a second Irish subsidiary. The firm sends profits from foreign sales to this first Irish 
subsidiary under the guise of “patent royalties”, allowing the firm to avoid both foreign 
and U.S. taxes payable due to those sales. Although the first subsidiary is incorporated in 
Ireland, it is controlled or managed in a different tax haven country (such as Bermuda); 
under Irish law, if this subsidiary is managed from a headquarters office in a foreign 
country, it is considered a “dual resident” and these profits can be transferred to another 
subsidiary in a tax haven country without first being taxed in Ireland. A Dutch subsidiary 
is also used to avoid withholding taxes on transfers between the other subsidiaries. By 
using all of these subsidiaries in the prescribed way, tax payments end up much lower than 
under a direct transfer to a tax haven country.14 Figure 1 presents a more detailed overview 
of the specific steps needed to implement this structure. 
                                                          
12 Large U.S. firms may keep as much as three-quarters of their cash abroad (Schoenberger, Cahan R., “What 
Are U.S. Companies Doing With Their Cash? Many Hold It Abroad”, The Wall Street Journal July 2013); 
presumably  these firms keep as little cash in the U.S. as they can without impeding their normal operations. 
13 Johnston, David Cay, “I.R.S. Moves to Close Tax Shelter Shortly After I.B.M. Uses It to Save $1.6 
Billion”, The New York Times June 2007. 
14 “Why would anyone opt for the Double Irish over the Single Bermudan? Because of tax treaties. When 
you transfer money within the EU, the government doesn't take a cut in the form of a withholding tax. When 
money goes directly to an unregulated country like Bermuda, however, it gets taxed at the origin country's 




























































The earliest use of “Double Irish” structures I could find in the press dates back to 
Apple in the 1980s.15 As one might expect given the structure outlined above, firms with a 
great deal of proprietary intellectual property and foreign sales (such as firms in the 
pharmaceutical and technology industries) have most often been associated with “Double 
Irish” structures. Companies confirmed to have adopted this technique by press articles 
include Apple, Adobe Systems, Boston Scientific, eBay, Facebook, Amazon.com, Twitter, 
Microsoft, Intel, Novell, Yahoo, Abbott Laboratories, and Pfizer. The technique represents 
perhaps the most effective tax shelter structure to date. For example, Forest Laboratories 
cut its annual tax rate from 10.3% to 2.4% and Google reduced taxes by more than $3.1 
billion over three years using the technique.16 
IV.B. The Exogeneity of the Shock and Key Assumptions 
My tests using this shock rely on three assumptions: 1) the regulatory shock is 
exogenous and should have no direct impact on forecast revisions outside of its impact on 
repurchases, 2) repurchases by tax haven-using firms are more costly for these firms after 
the IRS regulation, and 3) outsiders interpret OMR announcements from “Double Irish” 
firms as credible commitments to repurchase.  I lay out the evidence and logic behind these 
assumptions in the following paragraphs. 
There are a number of reasons why the shock should not affect earnings 
expectations through other channels (besides the OMR announcement), as the first 
assumption suggests. Since the IRS regulation specifically affects corporate taxes, the 
regulation won’t directly impact pre-tax operating performance. A more intuitive 
endogeneity concern is that the shock might have a direct effect on managers’ investment 
decisions (and, in turn, earnings expectations) by altering the valuation of U.S. investment 
opportunities. However, both Dharmapala et al. (2011) and Faulkender and Petersen 
(2012) suggest that a recent shock to repatriation costs (the 2004 American Jobs Creation 
Act) had little effect on domestic investment in most U.S. firms. Finally, since repatriation 
                                                          
15 Duhigg, Charles and David Kocieniewski, “How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes”, The New York 
Times April 2012. 
16 Drucker, Jesse, “U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes With Global Odyssey”, Bloomberg News 




is required only for domestic investments, the repurchase cost shock is not likely to directly 
affect foreign investment decisions in financially unconstrained firms. 
Regarding the second assumption, many OMRs are funded with temporary spikes 
in non-operating earnings (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000)) or excess cash. 
Since these funding methods are unlikely to result in reduced investment or new outside 
financing (the “costs” used in Miller and Rock’s (1985) and Bhattacharya’s (1979) 
signaling models, respectively), it is unclear whether the average OMR program is truly 
costly. However, there is anecdotal evidence that repurchasing firms with untaxed, offshore 
profits overseas did incur additional costs after the 2007 IRS ruling. Some firms chose to 
bring back offshore profits and pay repatriation taxes,17 while others issued new debt or 
used domestic cash to fund share buybacks.18 Each of these choices carried an incremental 
cost of repurchasing, whether the cost was direct (repatriation taxes or interest payments 
on debt) or indirect (depletion of domestic cash reserves, which affects how much cash can 
be sent offshore in the future). In contrast to studies of repatriation related to domestic firm 
acquisitions (Martin et al. (2015)), I find no evidence that firms used “loopholes” to 
continue cost-free repatriation of foreign cash for repurchases after the 2007 regulation. 
The third assumption relates to whether or not outsiders believe that managers will 
actually follow through on an announced OMR program. As Rau and Vermaelen (2002) 
and Lie (2005) note, managers are under no obligation to complete or even begin 
announced OMR programs. However, firms with tax havens typically have high cash 
holdings (Foley et al. (2007)) and are routinely scrutinized by shareholders due to these 
cash holdings, as the coverage of a recent Apple buyback illustrates.19 I assume that this 
combination of media attention and vocal shareholders makes these particular companies 
relatively more likely to actually follow through on announced OMR plans. Empirical 
                                                          
17 These firms include eBay (Santoli, Michael, “Why is eBay eager to pay a tax that Apple works to avoid?”, 
finance.yahoo.com, April 2014) and General Electric (McKinnon, John D. and Liz Hoffman, “GE Bites Tax 
Bullet in Move to Help Share Buybacks”, The Wall Street Journal April 2015). 
18 Apple has done both in the past, using domestic cash reserves (Vascellaro, Jessica E., “Apple Pads Investor 
Wallets”, The Wall Street Journal March 2012)) and issuing debt (“Apple’s Tax Dodge”, cnn.com April 
2013) to fund buybacks. 
19 “Apple on Monday bowed to mounting pressure to return some of its roughly $100 billion in cash reserves 
to shareholders…(shareholders) clamoring for a cut of Apple's growing cash stockpile increased in recent 
years…” Vascellaro, Jessica E., “Apple Pads Investor Wallets”, The Wall Street Journal March 2012. 
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evidence supports this claim; using actual repurchase data from Compustat (data item 
“cshopq”), I find that only 2.6% of firms likely to be using “Double Irish” structures fail 
to follow an OMR announcement with actual repurchases in the four quarters after the 
announcement (this fraction is more than four times higher for the remaining firms in my 
sample). 
IV.C. Data and Key Predictions 
To my knowledge, there is no complete, existing source for firms that have adopted 
Double Irish structures. I instead estimate which firms are more likely to use these 
structures. I begin by hand-collecting data on subsidiaries (and their country of 
incorporation) from Mergent for each NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX-listed firm in that 
database. This produces subsidiary information for 9,965 separate firms, which I hand-
match to Compustat data based on company name. I classify a firm as likely to be using a 
“Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” structure (and set an indicator variable Irish Likely 
equal to one) if it has at least two subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland, one subsidiary 
incorporated in the Netherlands, and one subsidiary incorporated in another country 
commonly identified as a tax haven (using a list based on a Desai et al. (2006) study of tax 
havens). I further classify a firm as using any type tax haven (Any Haven = 1) if it contains 
at least one subsidiary incorporated in a country identified as a tax haven (based on the 
Desai et al. (2006) study). These countries include the Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Ireland, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Panama, 
Singapore, Switzerland, and the UK Virgin Islands. Irish Likely (Any Haven) firms make 
up 8.6% (36.0%) of total firm assets in the last eight years of my sample.20
                                                          
20 Since the Mergent data reflects only the most recent company filings, the haven identification indicators 
are time invariant. Therefore another key assumption in my tests is that these haven structures or similarly 






































Although many firms establish subsidiaries in foreign countries due to business 
interests in those countries, the unique structure of the “Double Irish” method makes it 
highly likely that firms with this combination of subsidiaries are using this tax avoidance 
technique. However, the possibility remains that my procedure could misclassify firms as 
“Irish Likely” if they use the subsidiaries described above for some purpose other than tax 
avoidance (or I could misclassify firms as “non-Irish Likely” if they fail to disclose key 
subsidiary information, despite the SEC requirement to do so). To examine whether this 
classification process appears to accurately identify “Irish Likely” firms, in Figure 2 I 
present an SIC 2-digit industry-level breakdown of all Compustat-listed firms where Irish 
Likely is equal to 1. As expected, these firms are concentrated in industries where Double 
Irish structures have been identified in the popular press, such as business services (Adobe, 
eBay, Facebook, Google, Microsoft), chemicals & allied products (Abbott Laboratories, 
Forest Laboratories, Pfizer), industrial and commercial machinery (Apple), measuring and 
analyzing instruments (Boston Scientific), and electronic and other electrical equipment 
(Intel). 
These variables, along with an indicator variable (After Law) signifying the period 
after the passage of the IRS regulation, allow me to use the regulation as a quasi-natural 
experiment to test three predictions using the proxy for revisions in earnings expectations 
(AFR). The first prediction follows directly from the signaling and earnings-related 
undervaluation hypotheses: 
1. AFR should be positive, on average, after the IRS regulation in the OMR-
announcing firms more likely to be storing untaxed profits in offshore tax havens. 
After the regulation, tax-avoiding firms have a choice: repurchase shares and bear the 
incremental cost, or don’t repurchase and avoid this cost. For non-tax-avoiding firms with 
sufficient cash to fund an OMR program, their repurchase decisions are not accompanied 
by the same types of incremental costs, either before or after the reform. Put differently, 
the 2007 regulation should alter repurchase-related decision making only in firms taking 
advantage of foreign tax havens.  This leads to my second prediction: 
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2. The change in repurchaser AFR from before to after the regulation should be 
higher for firms likely to be utilizing tax havens than other firms (a “difference-in-
difference” test). 
Finally, one key empirical challenge of payout policy studies is that the same accounting 
and economic variables that typically proxy for repurchase motivations may also directly 
influence AFRs in all firms. For example, Average Q may proxy for repurchase motives 
related to overinvestment concerns, but Q is also plausibly related to earnings expectations 
for all firms (as firms with low Q might be more likely to have negative AFRs). To argue 
that positive AFRs are consistent with positive earnings information conveyed by OMR 
announcements, a falsification test is necessary to demonstrate that evidence of positive 
mean AFRs is only found in periods when an OMR program is announced. This leads to 
the third and final prediction: 
3. The “difference-in-difference” from Prediction 2 should be positive and significant 
for OMR-announcement periods but not for other periods (a “triple difference” 
test). 
Evidence consistent with these predictions should be the strongest in the “Double Irish”-
likely firm subsample, since repurchases should be relatively more costly on average for 
firms using the (more effective) Double Irish structure than the larger subsample of firms 
using any tax haven. 
Although it is possible that any better-than-expected earnings signaled by OMR 
announcements would not be detectable if they are offset by additional repurchase costs, 
this is unlikely to be the case for two reasons. First, firms are unlikely to repurchase due to 
better-than-expected earnings if the benefits of repurchasing are completely offset by 
additional tax costs. Second, numerous studies have shown that analysts fail to fully 
incorporate known changes in tax impacts into their forecasts (Chen and Schoderbek 
(2000), Plumlee (2003), Kim, Schmidt, and Wentland (2014)), perhaps because the costs 
of incorporating this complex information exceed the benefits to these analysts (Plumlee 
(2003)). Later tests of actual earnings use a pre-tax measure of earnings (ROCAA) that 
should be unaffected by any tax-related costs. 
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My empirical methodology is designed to minimize the possibility that events or 
factors other than the IRS regulation could explain my test results. First, I use a variety of 
fixed effects in my multiple regression tests. For example, I include month-year fixed 
effects in several specifications. For some omitted variable or event (contemporaneous 
with the passage of the regulation) to be able to explain my results in these specifications, 
this variable would need to positively correlate with the indicator variable for “Double 
Irish” firms and have a similar predicted effect on forecast revisions. I also use firm fixed 
effects to conduct within-firm tests of whether analyst reactions to OMR announcements 
change after the passage of the 2007 regulation. Second, I include non-repurchase-
announcing firms in my triple difference specifications as a falsification test. Any omitted 
variable responsible for the results would not only need to correlate with the “Double Irish” 
and tax haven indicators, it would also have to have a much stronger positive correlation 


















V.A Main Tests of Abnormal Forecast Revisions 
In this section, I test my predictions in a variety of empirical settings. My tests use 
two different sample periods: a subset of years directly surrounding the IRS regulation 
(2004-2011) and the full sample used in earlier tests (1984-2011). Table 4 presents the 
results of univariate tests of AFRs using subsamples based on the Irish Likely and After 
Law indicators. 
Panel A presents mean AFRs following forecast update periods when OMRs are 
announced, while Panel B uses all remaining observations. For the firms where repurchases 
are likely to be costly (“Irish Likely” firms after the IRS law, shown in the middle box in 
Panel A), the mean AFRs are positive for every timeframe and typically statistically 
significant, consistent with my first prediction. Notably, these positive AFRs are found 
despite the post-law period coinciding with the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which 
should negatively impact AFR in most firms (this is confirmed by the coefficient and 
significance of Decline in later multivariate tests). The results are also consistent with my 
second prediction, as the differences in mean AFRs from before to after the regulation are 
significantly higher in “Irish Likely” firms than other firms in most cases (as shown in the 
“difference-in-difference” results in the lower right corner). 
The results are noticeably different for non-OMR-announcement periods.  In Panel 
B, there is no evidence that the “Irish Likely”, post-law-change firms have significantly 
positive AFRs (on average) during these periods. There is also no evidence that “Irish 
Likely” firms show greater average AFR increases than non-“Irish Likely” firms after the 
IRS law. The bottom-right box in Panel B computes the “triple difference” measures 
outlined in my third prediction, which are positive in all cases and statistically significant 
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in six of seven cases. Panels C and D repeat these tests in the 1984-2011 sample with 
similar conclusions. 
 
Table 4: Univariate Difference-in-Difference Tests Using a Shock to Repurchase Costs 
Caption: The variables of interest are Abnormal Forecast Revisions (AFRs) for firms, 
where an Abnormal Forecast Revision is defined as the change in median forecasted 
earnings-per-share (scaled by lagged firm price) minus the "expected change" in the analyst 
earnings-per-share forecast.  The "expected change" used in the AFR calculation is the 
same measure used in Table 2, Panel C. Only observations where the forecast revision does 
not contain a contemporaneous earnings announcement are included. AFR measures are 
scaled up by 1,000.  All earning-per-share forecast information is obtained from I/B/E/S.  
Median analyst forecasts for the entire I/B/E/S database are trimmed at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles prior to the construction of AFR, and all observations with a lagged stock price 
of less than $1 are dropped. "Time period" for the I/B/E/S forecast measures is defined in 
Table 1.  After Law is equal to one if the the observation is between June 2007 and the end 
of 2011 (and zero otherwise). Irish Likely is equal to one if a firm has at least two 
subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland, one subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands, and 
one subsidiary incorporated in another tax haven country, as classified by Desai et al. 
(2006) (and zero otherwise).  Panels A and C use AFRs following update periods when 
firms make open market repurchase announcements, and Panels B and D use AFRs for all 
other  I/B/E/S observations. ***, ** and * indicate significance using two-tailed t-tests at 






Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 570 -0.07 -1.01 Qtr + 0 73 0.12 1.22 Qtr + 0 0.19 1.58
Qtr + 1 581 0.09 * 1.87 Qtr + 1 73 -0.04 -0.28 Qtr + 1 -0.13 -0.85
Qtr + 2 569 0.13 *** 2.65 Qtr + 2 73 0.03 0.24 Qtr + 2 -0.10 -0.75
Qtr + 3 537 0.08 1.55 Qtr + 3 71 0.02 0.20 Qtr + 3 -0.05 -0.42
Year + 0 596 0.15 1.12 Year + 0 73 0.10 0.43 Year + 0 -0.05 -0.18
Year + 1 587 0.51 ** 2.06 Year + 1 72 0.47 0.96 Year + 1 -0.04 -0.07
Year + 2 360 0.80 *** 4.83 Year + 2 66 0.27 0.48 Year + 2 -0.53 -0.90
Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 875 0.06 0.89 Qtr + 0 87 0.23 *** 5.81 Qtr + 0 0.17 ** 2.07
Qtr + 1 847 -0.22 ** -1.98 Qtr + 1 80 0.12 *** 3.59 Qtr + 1 0.34 *** 2.92
Qtr + 2 747 -0.20 ** -2.13 Qtr + 2 73 0.20 *** 4.13 Qtr + 2 0.40 *** 3.82
Qtr + 3 677 -0.16 * -1.67 Qtr + 3 70 0.15 *** 2.65 Qtr + 3 0.32 *** 2.79
Year + 0 876 -0.44 -1.63 Year + 0 79 0.14 0.73 Year + 0 0.58 * 1.74
Year + 1 664 -0.81 ** -2.14 Year + 1 60 0.56 *** 5.92 Year + 1 1.38 *** 3.52
Year + 2 331 -1.30 ** -2.18 Year + 2 38 1.00 ** 2.20 Year + 2 2.31 *** 3.07
Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 0.13 1.34 Qtr + 0 0.11 1.08 Qtr + 0 -0.02 -0.15
Qtr + 1 -0.31 *** -2.57 Qtr + 1 0.16 1.05 Qtr + 1 0.48 ** 2.42
Qtr + 2 -0.32 *** -3.12 Qtr + 2 0.17 1.32 Qtr + 2 0.50 *** 2.97
Qtr + 3 -0.24 ** -2.20 Qtr + 3 0.13 0.98 Qtr + 3 0.37 ** 2.16
Year + 0 -0.59 * -1.96 Year + 0 0.04 0.14 Year + 0 0.63 1.46
Year + 1 -1.32 *** -2.92 Year + 1 0.09 0.19 Year + 1 1.42 ** 2.10
Year + 2 -2.10 *** -3.39 Year + 2 0.73 1.01 Year + 2 2.83 *** 2.98
difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0) difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0)
After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 0 After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 1 difference (Irish Likely  = 1 - Irish Likely  = 0)
difference-in-difference
Panel A: Sample from 2004-2011, Repurchase-Announcing Firm Observations






Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 63,660 0.07 *** 6.83 Qtr + 0 3,364 0.20 *** 13.35 Qtr + 0 0.13 *** 7.10
Qtr + 1 71,985 0.13 *** 14.27 Qtr + 1 3,926 0.16 *** 14.49 Qtr + 1 0.02 1.49
Qtr + 2 68,493 0.15 *** 17.23 Qtr + 2 3,851 0.17 *** 15.36 Qtr + 2 0.03 * 1.92
Qtr + 3 54,223 0.11 *** 14.29 Qtr + 3 3,208 0.13 *** 10.05 Qtr + 3 0.02 1.33
Year + 0 79,681 0.25 *** 10.32 Year + 0 3,951 0.27 *** 10.87 Year + 0 0.01 0.36
Year + 1 77,297 0.49 *** 17.76 Year + 1 3,949 0.62 *** 17.42 Year + 1 0.13 *** 2.98
Year + 2 38,334 0.59 *** 11.26 Year + 2 2,892 0.67 *** 11.33 Year + 2 0.07 0.94
Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 94,567 -0.05 *** -3.29 Qtr + 0 4,487 -0.01 -0.24 Qtr + 0 0.05 1.37
Qtr + 1 101,182 -0.10 *** -3.43 Qtr + 1 4,836 -0.06 ** -2.00 Qtr + 1 0.04 1.01
Qtr + 2 93,272 -0.11 *** -3.24 Qtr + 2 4,566 -0.02 -0.84 Qtr + 2 0.09 ** 2.08
Qtr + 3 73,862 -0.09 *** -4.89 Qtr + 3 3,827 0.01 0.32 Qtr + 3 0.10 *** 2.72
Year + 0 110,252 -0.18 *** -4.58 Year + 0 4,969 -0.27 *** -3.40 Year + 0 -0.09 -1.00
Year + 1 87,362 -0.45 *** -4.67 Year + 1 4,016 -0.19 ** -2.07 Year + 1 0.25 * 1.90
Year + 2 38,903 -0.61 *** -5.12 Year + 2 2,492 -0.35 ** -2.35 Year + 2 0.25 1.33
Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 -0.12 *** -6.41 Qtr + 0 -0.20 *** -6.10 Qtr + 0 -0.08 ** -2.08
Qtr + 1 -0.23 *** -7.74 Qtr + 1 -0.21 *** -6.98 Qtr + 1 0.02 0.46
Qtr + 2 -0.26 *** -7.22 Qtr + 2 -0.19 *** -6.84 Qtr + 2 0.06 1.39
Qtr + 3 -0.20 *** -10.19 Qtr + 3 -0.12 *** -3.63 Qtr + 3 0.08 ** 1.98
Year + 0 -0.43 *** -9.38 Year + 0 -0.53 *** -6.49 Year + 0 -0.10 -1.06
Year + 1 -0.93 *** -9.38 Year + 1 -0.81 *** -8.12 Year + 1 0.12 0.85
Year + 2 -1.20 *** -9.24 Year + 2 -1.02 *** -6.32 Year + 2 0.18 0.87
Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 0.06 0.40
Qtr + 1 0.46 ** 2.26
Qtr + 2 0.43 ** 2.50
Qtr + 3 0.30 * 1.68
Year + 0 0.73 * 1.66
Year + 1 1.30 * 1.88
Year + 2 2.65 *** 2.72
difference-in-difference
triple difference (repurchaser vs. all other 
firms, 2004-2011)
difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0) difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0)
After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 0 After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 1 difference (Irish Likely  = 1 - Irish Likely  = 0)
After Law  = 0, Irish Likely  = 0 After Law  = 0, Irish Likely  = 1 difference (Irish Likely  = 1 - Irish Likely  = 0)





Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 3,567 -0.07 -1.39 Qtr + 0 305 0.20 *** 4.97 Qtr + 0 0.27 *** 4.31
Qtr + 1 3,301 -0.02 -0.52 Qtr + 1 303 0.01 0.25 Qtr + 1 0.04 0.52
Qtr + 2 2,996 0.03 0.77 Qtr + 2 296 0.06 1.22 Qtr + 2 0.03 0.57
Qtr + 3 2,489 -0.01 -0.15 Qtr + 3 267 0.02 0.29 Qtr + 3 0.02 0.33
Year + 0 4,296 -0.03 -0.29 Year + 0 317 0.45 *** 4.18 Year + 0 0.48 *** 3.19
Year + 1 3,886 -0.23 * -1.68 Year + 1 310 0.50 *** 3.21 Year + 1 0.72 *** 3.53
Year + 2 1,087 0.16 1.23 Year + 2 186 0.36 1.18 Year + 2 0.20 0.60
Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 875 0.21 *** 2.97 Qtr + 0 87 0.37 *** 9.52 Qtr + 0 0.17 ** 2.07
Qtr + 1 847 -0.18 * -1.65 Qtr + 1 80 0.16 *** 4.72 Qtr + 1 0.34 *** 2.92
Qtr + 2 747 -0.21 ** -2.24 Qtr + 2 73 0.19 *** 3.92 Qtr + 2 0.40 *** 3.82
Qtr + 3 677 -0.17 * -1.70 Qtr + 3 70 0.15 *** 2.60 Qtr + 3 0.32 *** 2.79
Year + 0 876 0.04 0.14 Year + 0 79 0.62 *** 3.13 Year + 0 0.58 * 1.74
Year + 1 664 -0.65 * -1.71 Year + 1 60 0.73 *** 7.66 Year + 1 1.38 *** 3.52
Year + 2 331 -1.37 ** -2.29 Year + 2 38 0.94 ** 2.06 Year + 2 2.31 *** 3.07
Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 0.27 *** 3.24 Qtr + 0 0.17 *** 3.01 Qtr + 0 -0.10 -1.01
Qtr + 1 -0.16 -1.34 Qtr + 1 0.14 ** 2.20 Qtr + 1 0.30 ** 2.23
Qtr + 2 -0.23 ** -2.37 Qtr + 2 0.13 * 1.88 Qtr + 2 0.36 *** 3.02
Qtr + 3 -0.16 -1.53 Qtr + 3 0.13 1.55 Qtr + 3 0.29 ** 2.17
Year + 0 0.07 0.24 Year + 0 0.17 0.75 Year + 0 0.10 0.28
Year + 1 -0.42 -1.05 Year + 1 0.23 1.29 Year + 1 0.66 1.49
Year + 2 -1.53 ** -2.50 Year + 2 0.58 1.06 Year + 2 2.11 *** 2.57
After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 0 After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 1 difference (Irish Likely  = 1 - Irish Likely  = 0)
difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0) difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0) difference-in-difference
Panel C: Sample from 1984-2011, Repurchase-Announcing Firm Observations












Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 313,185 -0.04 *** -5.77 Qtr + 0 16,195 0.23 *** 23.16 Qtr + 0 0.27 *** 22.14
Qtr + 1 321,573 0.01 ** 2.23 Qtr + 1 18,165 0.11 *** 10.87 Qtr + 1 0.10 *** 8.22
Qtr + 2 288,720 0.03 *** 6.30 Qtr + 2 17,325 0.09 *** 10.32 Qtr + 2 0.06 *** 5.61
Qtr + 3 198,953 0.03 *** 4.94 Qtr + 3 12,946 0.07 *** 7.37 Qtr + 3 0.04 *** 3.77
Year + 0 442,496 -0.10 *** -5.98 Year + 0 19,451 0.56 *** 24.63 Year + 0 0.66 *** 23.37
Year + 1 395,088 0.04 ** 2.35 Year + 1 19,089 0.55 *** 19.61 Year + 1 0.51 *** 15.64
Year + 2 107,362 0.21 *** 6.78 Year + 2 8,800 0.52 *** 10.07 Year + 2 0.30 *** 5.03
Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd N Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 94,567 0.09 *** 5.63 Qtr + 0 4,487 0.14 *** 4.63 Qtr + 0 0.05 1.37
Qtr + 1 101,182 -0.06 ** -2.11 Qtr + 1 4,836 -0.02 -0.68 Qtr + 1 0.04 1.01
Qtr + 2 93,272 -0.12 *** -3.52 Qtr + 2 4,566 -0.03 -1.22 Qtr + 2 0.09 ** 2.08
Qtr + 3 73,862 -0.09 *** -5.06 Qtr + 3 3,827 0.01 0.22 Qtr + 3 0.10 *** 2.72
Year + 0 110,252 0.30 *** 7.60 Year + 0 4,969 0.21 *** 2.66 Year + 0 -0.09 -1.00
Year + 1 87,362 -0.28 *** -2.95 Year + 1 4,016 -0.03 -0.30 Year + 1 0.25 * 1.90
Year + 2 38,903 -0.67 *** -5.68 Year + 2 2,492 -0.42 *** -2.80 Year + 2 0.25 1.33
Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat Time Pd Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 0.13 *** 7.49 Qtr + 0 -0.09 *** -2.96 Qtr + 0 -0.23 *** -6.26
Qtr + 1 -0.07 ** -2.53 Qtr + 1 -0.13 *** -4.33 Qtr + 1 -0.06 -1.36
Qtr + 2 -0.16 *** -4.46 Qtr + 2 -0.13 *** -4.55 Qtr + 2 0.03 0.68
Qtr + 3 -0.12 *** -6.36 Qtr + 3 -0.07 ** -2.03 Qtr + 3 0.05 1.44
Year + 0 0.40 *** 9.35 Year + 0 -0.35 *** -4.35 Year + 0 -0.75 *** -8.18
Year + 1 -0.32 *** -3.30 Year + 1 -0.57 *** -5.88 Year + 1 -0.25 * -1.84
Year + 2 -0.89 *** -7.23 Year + 2 -0.94 *** -5.90 Year + 2 -0.05 -0.24
Mean tstat
Qtr + 0 0.12 1.15
Qtr + 1 0.36 ** 2.53
Qtr + 2 0.33 *** 2.59
Qtr + 3 0.24 * 1.71
Year + 0 0.85 ** 2.26
Year + 1 0.91 ** 1.97
Year + 2 2.16 ** 2.55
difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0) difference (After Law  = 1 - After Law  = 0) difference-in-difference
triple difference (repurchaser vs. all other 
firms, 1984-2011)
Panel D: Sample from 1984-2011, All Other Firm Observations
After Law  = 0, Irish Likely  = 0 After Law  = 0, Irish Likely  = 1 difference (Irish Likely  = 1 - Irish Likely  = 0)
After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 0 After Law  = 1, Irish Likely  = 1 difference (Irish Likely  = 1 - Irish Likely  = 0)
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Overall, these results suggest that firms likely to be using a “Double Irish with a 
Dutch Sandwich” structure are doing one of two things: 1) explicitly conveying positive 
earnings information with OMR announcements, or 2) timing their announcements to 
correspond with periods where upcoming earnings are underestimated. I now examine the 
same predictions in a multiple regression setting in order to more explicitly control for 
other variables and factors that might influence or bias AFR. I estimate the following triple 
differencing specification in the six forecast timeframes where univariate evidence 
consistent with my predictions was found: 
𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡)+ 𝛽5(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.         (5)                                      
Repurchaser is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm announces an OMR program 
during that observation’s I/B/E/S update period and X is a matrix of control variables 
(including the lagged value of AFR). The coefficient of 𝛽7 represents the triple difference 
measure. I also calculate the incremental AFR for an “Irish Likely”, “post-law” 
repurchasing firm by adding together all seven Beta coefficients; this is shown as a memo 
item in each panel. Results are reported in Table 5. 
 The results in Panel A are consistent with the univariate test results. The triple 
difference variable is positive in every specification and significant at the 10% level or 
better in nine of twelve specifications. The sum of the key coefficients (the incremental 
average AFR for my key sample) is positive in every case, consistent with the idea that 
OMR announcements from “Irish Likely”, post-law firms convey information about better-
than-expected earnings on average. (In unreported Wald tests, I find that these sums are 
greater than zero at the 1% significance level in all specifications.) Note that in Panel A 
that the coefficients of Lagged AFR are very low; this lack of autocorrelation in the 
dependent variable, combined with the use of clustering at the month-year level, reduce 




Table 5: OLS Triple Difference Tests of Abnormal Forecast Revisions Using a 
Shock to Repurchase Costs 
Caption: The dependent variables are Abnormal Forecast Revisions (AFRs), where an 
Abnormal Forecast Revision is defined as the change in median forecasted earnings-per-
share (scaled by lagged firm price) minus the "expected change" in the analyst earnings-
per-share forecast.  The "expected change" used in the AFR calculation is the same measure 
used in Table 2, Panel C.  Only observations where the forecast revision does not contain 
a contemporaneous earnings announcement are included. AFR is scaled up by 1,000.  
Median analyst forecasts for the entire I/B/E/S database are trimmed at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles prior to the construction of AFR, and all observations with a lagged stock price 
of less than $1 are dropped. "Time period" for the I/B/E/S forecast measures is defined in 
Table 1.  The key independent variables are After Law, which is equal to one if the the 
observation is between June 2007 and the end of 2011 (and zero otherwise), Irish Likely, 
which is equal to one if a firm has at least two subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland, one 
subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands, and one subsidiary incorporated in another tax 
haven country, as classified by Desai et al. (2006) (and zero otherwise), Repurchaser, 
which is equal to one if an open market repurchase announcement occurs during the 
forecast update period for a particular firm (and zero otherwise), and double and triple 
interactions between these three variables. All "lagged" control variables refer to values 
obtained one quarter prior to the current fiscal quarter, with the exception of Lagged 
ScaledCapEx, which consists of capital expenditures scaled by average cash-adjusted 
assets over the last four fiscal quarters, and Lagged AFR, which refers to the value of AFR 
in the previous month (I/B/E/S forecasts are updated on a monthly basis).  All variables 
used in the regression are defined in the Appendix.  All non-indicator accounting variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  OLS coefficients for all explanatory 
variables are reported.  t-statistics for all variables are reported in parentheses underneath 
the coefficients.  Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
month-year level.  ***, ** and * indicate coefficients with statistically significant 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Panel B, I re-estimate the key regressions including two-digit SIC code industry 
fixed effects and month-year fixed effects.21 The results are robust to this change; 𝛽7 is 
positive in all cases and significant in eight of twelve specifications. Finally, Panel C 
presents results using firm and period fixed effects. 𝛽7 is positive in all cases and 
statistically significant in six specifications. 
 These tests all use the novel measure of analyst forecast revisions described in 
Section II. In unreported tests I repeat the multiple regressions in Table 5 with an 
unadjusted measure of forecast revisions (raw median I/B/E/S analyst EPS revisions, 
scaled by lagged firm price). I obtain similar coefficients and significance levels for both 
𝛽7 and the sum of all Beta coefficients, suggesting that my results are not unique to the 
bias-adjusted definition of AFR used throughout the paper. This outcome is logical, since 
“optimism bias” common to all firm forecast revisions would be picked up by 𝛼 and “size-
related bias” should be picked up by my control variables. 
To get a sense of the economic significance of these results, I begin by using the 
Panel C “Quarter + 1” 𝛽7 coefficient in specification (1) (equal to 0.52, or 0.00052 without 
the “factor of 1,000” gross-up) and “un-scale” this estimated AFR impact by multiplying 
the median lagged share price among all Irish Likely, post-law firms ($38.60). This gives 
a value of 0.00052 * $38.60 = $0.020, representing an upwards quarterly forecast revision 
of 2.0 cents (relative to other firms). Brous and Kini (1993) suggest that only one-fifth of 
analysts update their EPS estimates during a given forecast period, so this EPS estimate 
could theoretically have been as high as 2.0 * 5 = 10 cents per quarter (40 cents per year) 
if non-updating analysts would have made similar revisions. 
 To estimate repurchase costs in “Irish Likely” firms, I start with data on the mean 
percentage of shares sought in the repurchase announcement obtained from the SDC 
database; this is 6.9% for “Irish Likely” repurchasers from 2008-2011. The mean shares 
outstanding for these firms is 207 million. Bonaimé (2012) shows that, on average, 72.6% 
of an announced OMR will be completed within two years, so funds used for a typical 
repurchase are approximately 207,000,000 * .069 * .726 * $38.60 = $400 million. If firms 
                                                          
21 For space reasons, the coefficients and significance of the control variables are omitted from the remaining 
panels and other multivariate tests. Results for these control variables remain similar throughout the study. 
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were to fund their repurchases entirely with untaxed, offshore funds, the tax cost could be 
as large as $400M * .35 = $140 million (assuming a 35% U.S. corporate tax rate). This 
EPS impact is approximately $140M / 207M shares = $0.68 per share (or an average of 
$0.34 per year) under this “maximum cost” scenario. Given the high potential cost of 
repurchasing for these firms, it makes sense that firms affected by the shock would only 
repurchase if outsiders severely underestimate near-term earnings. 
Finally, I examine whether the results in Tables 4 and 5 hold for the subsample of 
firms with subsidiaries in any tax haven country. This subsample is of interest for two 
reasons. First, the number of firms with subsidiaries in any haven is larger than the number 
of firms likely to have Double Irish structures. Second, these tests examine the idea that 
evidence of earnings information should be stronger in “Irish Likely” firms than the larger 
sample of firms with any haven. 
The multiple regression tests using Any Haven in the three panels of Table 6 closely 
mirror those in Table 5. The triple difference coefficients are once again positive and 
generally significant in all panels. When the coefficients of all seven key variables are 
summed in Panel A, there is evidence consistent with positive incremental AFRs for this 
subsample, although these sums are generally lower than the corresponding sums using 
Irish Likely in Table 5. While these results suggest that the evidence of earnings 
information conveyed by costly repurchases is not unique to the (smaller) sample of “Irish 








Table 6: OLS Triple Difference Tests using an Alternative Tax Haven Variable 
Caption: The dependent variables are Abnormal Forecast Revisions (AFRs), where an 
Abnormal Forecast Revision is defined as the change in median forecasted earnings-per-
share (scaled by lagged firm price) minus the "expected change" in the analyst earnings-
per-share forecast.  The "expected change" used in the AFR calculation is the same 
measure used in Table 2, Panel C.  Only observations where the forecast revision does 
not contain a contemporaneous earnings announcement are included. AFR is scaled up by 
1,000.  Median analyst forecasts for the entire I/B/E/S database are trimmed at the 1st and 
99th percentiles prior to the construction of AFR, and all observations with a lagged 
stock price of less than $1 are dropped. "Time period" for the I/B/E/S forecast measures 
in Panel A is defined in Table 1.  The key independent variables are After Law, which is 
equal to one if the the observation is between June 2007 and the end of 2011 (and zero 
otherwise), Any Haven, which is equal to one if a firm has at least  one subsidiary 
incorporated in another tax haven country, as classified by Desai et al. (2006) (and zero 
otherwise), Repurchaser, which is equal to one if an open market repurchase 
announcement occurs during the forecast update period for a particular firm (and zero 
otherwise), and double and triple interactions between these three variables. All "lagged" 
control variables refer to values obtained one quarter prior to the current fiscal quarter, 
with the exception of Lagged ScaledCapEx, which consists of capital expenditures scaled 
by average cash-adjusted assets over the last four fiscal quarters, and Lagged AFR, which 
refers to the value of AFR in the previous month (I/B/E/S forecasts are updated on a 
monthly basis).  All variables used in the regression are defined in the Appendix.  All 
non-indicator accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  OLS 
coefficients for all explanatory variables are reported.  t-statistics for all variables are 
reported in parentheses underneath the coefficients.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the month-year level.  ***, ** and * indicate 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































V.B The Likelihood of Open Market Repurchase Announcements 
 If the 2007 IRS regulation had the hypothesized effect on the repurchase 
motivations for tax haven-using firms, the frequency of open market repurchase program 
announcements from haven-using firms should have been affected as well. In other words, 
if repurchases become more costly for tax-avoiding firms after this regulation, these firms 
should announce repurchase programs less frequently when compared to their (non-tax-
avoiding) peers during this period. 
 I test this hypothesis using conditional logit specifications of the indicator variable 
Repurchaser on the indicator variable After Law and control variables. The conditional 
logit regressions are run for three samples: 1) Firms likely to be using “Double Irish” tax 
avoidance techniques (Irish Likely = 1), 2) Firms unlikely to be using these techniques 
(Irish Likely = 0), and 3) the full sample of firms, using an interaction term (After Law * 
Irish Likely) to test whether the likelihood of an OMR announcement is significantly 
different between the two types of firms. Firm fixed effects are included in all 
specifications to test whether the likelihood of an OMR announcement changes after the 
regulation within each firm. I include I/B/E/S monthly observations both with and without 
contemporaneous earnings announcements in this sample; unlike tests of forecast 
revisions, the dependent variable of interest should be largely unaffected by other 





Table 7: Likelihood of Open Market Announcements 
Caption: The following table presents the results of conditional logit regressions of 
Repurchaser (which is equal to one if an open market repurchase announcement occurs 
during the forecast update period for a particular firm (and zero otherwise)) on After Law, 
which is equal to one if the observation is between June 2007 and the end of 2011 (and 
zero otherwise), Irish Likely, which is equal to one if a firm has at least two subsidiaries 
incorporated in Ireland, one subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands, and one 
subsidiary incorporated in another tax haven country, as classified by Desai et al. (2006) 
(and zero otherwise), a double interaction between these two variables, control variables, 
and firm fixed effects. All "lagged" control variables refer to values obtained one quarter 
prior to the current fiscal quarter, with the exception of Lagged ScaledCapEx, which 
consists of capital expenditures scaled by average cash-adjusted assets over the last four 
fiscal quarters. All variables used in the regression are defined in the Appendix.  All non-
indicator accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Coefficients 
for all explanatory variables are reported.  z-statistics for all variables are reported in 
parentheses underneath the coefficients.  ***, ** and * indicate coefficients with 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results of this test are presented in Table 7. In specification (1), After Law is 
insignificantly different from zero in the 2004-2011 sample, suggesting that the likelihood 
of an OMR announcement from Irish Likely firms is similar before and after the 2007 law 
change (after controlling for other firm-level variables). However, the results are different 
for non-Irish Likely firms, as shown in specification (2); these firms are significantly more 
likely to announce an OMR program after the 2007 reform (perhaps due to weak economic 
conditions during this period and a desire to “prop up” their stock prices). Specification (3) 
includes both types of firms in the sample, and the negative interaction term After Law * 
Irish Likely confirms that Irish Likely firms announce fewer OMR programs compared 
with other firms after the regulation.  Specifications (4)-(6) repeat these tests for the 1984-
2011 sample and find similar results. Overall, these results are consistent with the 2007 
regulation increasing repurchasing costs for “Irish Likely” firms, leading to (relatively) 
fewer OMR programs from these firms. 
V.C Changes in Actual Earnings Following Repurchase Announcements 
My tests to this point have largely focused on forecasted (rather than actual) 
earnings. The evidence thus far is only useful if 1) analysts can correctly assess which 
OMR announcements will be followed by actual repurchases, and 2) analyst earnings 
forecasts are consistent with realized earnings. To address the first concern, I examine 
whether analysts are generally able to predict which OMR announcements will be followed 
by actual repurchases. In unreported tests, I examine all observations from 2004-2011 
(when actual repurchase data is available in Compustat) where an OMR announcement 
was not followed with actual repurchases within the next four quarters. I find significantly 
negative average AFRs in five of six forecast timeframes for this subsample of OMR 
announcements, suggesting that analysts were not “fooled” by these announcements. 
To address the second concern, I examine post-OMR-announcement changes in 
actual earnings in “Irish Likely” firms after the IRS regulation. Lie (2005) suggests that 
“matched” earnings measures that compare repurchasers to matched, non-repurchasing 
firms are the most appropriate for tests, as an ideal matching procedure would control for 
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a repurchaser’s expected performance.22 To generate matched, non-repurchase-announcing 
firms, I use the propensity score matching (PSM) procedure developed by Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) create “nearest neighbor” matches as in Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003). I match on all key accounting control variables defined in Section II 
(matching on Decline is unnecessary since matches are determined within each quarter-
year cluster). Since future operating performance should not be influenced by whether or 
not earnings announcements coincide with analyst forecast update periods in I/B/E/S, I 
again use observations both with and without contemporaneous earnings announcements. 
Table 8 presents the mean values of these variables for both OMR-announcing and 
matched firms. With the exception of one variable, all of the mean firm characteristics are 
insignificantly different from one another at the 10% level of significance. Additionally, in 
untabulated results I find that lagged average abnormal accruals (constructed using the 
methodology in Kothari et al. (2005)) are insignificantly different between the treatment 
and matched samples. This reduces concerns that firms managing earnings downward in 
the quarter prior to an OMR announcement (documented by Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)) 




                                                          
22 These matching tests rely on two key assumptions: 1) the matching procedure was able to control for the 
most important predictors of earnings between paired repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms, and 2) any 
measured performance differences between sample and matched firms are primarily due to the sample firm’s 
decision to repurchase and the motivations behind that repurchase. 
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Table 8: Comparison of Repurchasing and Matching Firm Characteristics after 
Propensity Score Matching 
Caption: This table presents the characteristics of open market repurchase-announcing 
firms and non-repurchasing matching firms from 1984-2011.  The matching firms are the 
nearest-neighbor matches to repurchasing firms determined by a logit regression of 
Repurchaser (as defined in Table 7) on the characteristics listed below using the propensity 
score matching procedure developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Summary statistics are 
presented for observations with available data for all variables below and one-quarter-
leading values of Return on Cash-Adjusted Assets (ROCAA). Separate logit regressions 




Matching variable t-stat of mean diff
Repurchaser Matching
DivPayer 0.443 0.446 -0.49
Lagged Average Q 1.885 1.848 1.87
Lagged LnAssets 6.406 6.409 -0.09
Lagged ROCAA 0.045 0.045 0.10
Lagged change in ROCAA -0.002 -0.001 -1.44
Lagged Cash/Assets 0.167 0.163 1.49
Lagged ScaledCapEx 0.074 0.073 0.56
Lagged DebtRatio 0.189 0.186 0.94




Having paired repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms, I then calculate quarter-
over-quarter changes in ROCAA, starting with the quarter of the repurchase 
announcement. For example, the quarter “0” change compares quarters “0” and “-1” (the 
quarter on which treatment and control firm operating performance is matched), the quarter 
“+1” change compares quarters “+1” and “+0”, and so on. In Table 9, I report the 
cumulative post-announcement changes in matched ROCAA for zero, one, two, four, and 
eight full quarters after the open market announcement.23  The reported ROCAA changes 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
 In the 2004-2011 period (Panel A), after “quarter +0” (the OMR announcement 
quarter) the only significantly positive ROCAA changes are found in the “Irish Likely”, 
“post-law” subsample. While other pre-reform subsamples have significantly positive 
ROCAA changes in the larger 1984-2011 sample period (Panel B), the changes in ROCAA 
are typically highest in the subsample of “Irish Likely”, “post-law” repurchasers. For 
example, ROCAA changes in this subsample are about twice as large in magnitude as the 
changes in the “Irish Likely”, “pre-law” subsample for my three longest measurement 
periods. The mean cumulative change in ROCAA for the key subsample is 0.018 four full 
quarters after the repurchase announcement, or an average increase of 0.36 percentage 
points per quarter (including the announcement quarter). This is an economically 
meaningful increase when compared to the 4.5% mean ROCAA in Table 8. Overall, the 





                                                          
23 See the appendix for more details about the calculation of cumulative changes in matched ROCAA.  
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Table 9: Matched Measures of Post-Announcement Operating Performance 
Caption: This table presents the mean differences in cumulative quarter-over-quarter 
changes in Return on Cash-Adjusted Assets (ROCAA) between open market repurchase 
announcing firms and non-repurchasing matching firms (determined by the propensity 
score matching procedure outlined in Table 9).  All matched cumulative ROCAA 
measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. "Time period" for the I/B/E/S 
forecast measures is defined in Table 1. After Law is equal to one if the observation is 
between June 2007 and the end of 2011 (and zero otherwise). Irish Likely is equal to one 
if a firm has at least two subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland, one subsidiary incorporated 
in the Netherlands, and one subsidiary incorporated in another tax haven country, as 
classified by Desai et al. (2006) (and zero otherwise).  ***, ** and * indicate significance 




N Mean tstat N Mean tstat
qtr(0) 1,169 0.001 0.35 qtr(0) 113 0.002 0.37
qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 1,094 0.001 0.38 qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 110 -0.002 -0.32
qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 1,027 0.000 0.00 qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 105 0.004 0.92
qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 884 0.001 0.43 qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 94 0.009 1.45
qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 658 -0.004 -1.47 qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 75 0.000 0.04
N Mean tstat N Mean tstat
qtr(0) 2,130 0.002 1.83 * qtr(0) 194 0.006 1.94 *
qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 2,008 0.001 0.96 qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 183 0.004 1.08
qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 1,847 0.002 1.35 qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 173 0.009 2.01 **
qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 1,243 -0.001 -0.46 qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 110 0.018 2.24 **
qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 580 0.000 0.03 qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 44 0.022 1.93 *
Panel A: Cumulative Changes in ROCAA, 2004-2011
Before law change, non-Irish-likely Before law change, Irish-likely





N Mean tstat N Mean tstat
qtr(0) 5,580 0.002 2.36 ** qtr(0) 397 0.005 2.05 **
qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 5,137 0.002 2.94 *** qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 373 0.006 2.13 **
qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 4,683 0.001 0.55 qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 346 0.004 1.32
qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 3,877 0.002 1.96 ** qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 302 0.010 2.66 ***
qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 2,695 0.002 1.18 qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 238 0.012 2.56
N Mean tstat N Mean tstat
qtr(0) 2,130 0.002 1.83 * qtr(0) 194 0.006 1.94 *
qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 2,008 0.001 0.96 qtr(0) through qtr(+1) 183 0.004 1.08
qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 1,847 0.002 1.35 qtr(0) through qtr(+2) 173 0.009 2.01 **
qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 1,243 -0.001 -0.46 qtr(0) through qtr(+4) 110 0.018 2.24 **
qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 580 0.000 0.03 qtr(0) through qtr(+8) 44 0.022 1.93 *
Panel B: Cumulative Changes in ROCAA, 1984-2011
Before law change, non-Irish-likely
After law change, non-Irish-likely
Before law change, Irish-likely
After law change, Irish-likely
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V.D Testing an Alternative Explanation: “Managing” EPS 
Some studies suggest that certain firms “manage” actual EPS by decreasing the 
EPS denominator through share repurchases (Bens et al. (2003), Hribar et al. (2006), 
Almeida et al. (forthcoming)). This leads to two questions relevant to my study: 1) do 
analysts typically take these “accretive” effects into account? 2) If so, could the results in 
Tables 4 and 5 be explained by Irish Likely firms announcing larger or more credible 
repurchase programs after the 2007 regulation (relative to non-Irish Likely firms)? I 
examine these questions in greater detail below. 
First, I examine whether analysts typically account for accretive effects of 
repurchases in their forecasts. In an unreported test, I use the size of the repurchase program 
((%Sought, available in less than half of my OMR sample) as an independent variable in 
OLS specifications similar to those in Table 5 across all seven I/B/E/S timeframes. In 
untabulated results, I find that all twelve %Sought coefficients are insignificantly different 
from zero.  Additionally, five of the coefficients are negative (the opposite of what we 
would expect with accretive effects of repurchasing.) Since %Sought may not be 
representative of some firms’ actual repurchases, I repeat these tests in a subsample of 
firms who follow their OMR announcement with a large amount of immediate repurchases 
(i.e. they repurchase at least 1% of their shares outstanding within the first full quarter after 
the announcement, based on a similar measure of repurchase announcement credibility 
from Lie (2005)) and obtain similar results. Overall, these tests fail to find any evidence 
that analysts in my sample meaningfully account for EPS accretion in their forecasts. 
I further examine whether Irish Likely firms appear to announce larger or more 
credible repurchase programs relative to non-Irish Likely firms after the 2007 regulation. 
First, I find that the announced size of the repurchase program stays basically unchanged 
for both types of firms before and after the regulation; for Irish Likely firms, the mean 
%Sought is 6.9% in both periods, while the non-Irish Likely firm measure increases very 
slightly from 8.0% to 8.2%. Next, I investigate any changes in the credibility of repurchase 
programs by examining actual share repurchases. From 2004-2011, the percentage of Irish 
Likely firms that follow OMR announcements with actual repurchases in the following 
four quarters decreases from 97.8% (before the regulation) to 97.1% (after the regulation), 
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while this measure increases from 88.1% to 89.6% in non-Irish Likely firms. This suggests 
that repurchase credibility actually becomes stronger in non-Irish Likely firms after the 
reform, which is again inconsistent with accretive effects explaining our results. Finally, I 
examine both the size and credibility of repurchase programs by calculating the percentage 
of actual shares repurchased within the first full quarter after the announcement 
(%Repurchased). For Double Irish firms, average %Repurchased increases from 3.3% 
(before the regulation) to 3.5% (after the regulation), but %Repurchased actually increases 
by more in non-Irish Likely firms (from 3.0% to 3.6%) over this same period. This suggest 
that increases in Irish Likely firms’ OMR program size and credibility (from before to after 
the law) are less than similar changes in non-Irish Likely firms, again making it unlikely 
that accretive effects driven by changes in repurchase program size or credibility in Double 
Irish firms can explain this study’s key findings. Taken together, these tests all suggest that 
























 Two important results emerge from this study. First, I show that evidence consistent 
with unfavorable earnings information conveyed by OMR announcements in past studies 
may have been due to undetected biases in those studies’ proxies for earnings expectations. 
Second, I examine unique subsamples of firms where repurchasing costs were likely to be 
high: firms that utilize offshore subsidiaries to store untaxed profits. An IRS regulation in 
2007 effectively generated new repurchasing costs for these firms, allowing me to test 
whether these costs were accompanied by upward revisions in earnings expectations after 
OMR announcements. I find strong evidence of positive average abnormal forecast 
revisions in these subsamples of repurchasers, especially in firms where costs are likely to 
be the highest (those likely to be using a “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” tax shelter 
structure). 
 To my knowledge, this is the first study to link these particular costs with the 
likelihood of a repurchase program announcement and with positive revisions in both 
forecasted and actual earnings. Even if managers in tax haven-using firms are not explicitly 
signaling earnings through their repurchase announcements, this study suggests that the 
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 𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝐹𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
Data for this measure are obtained from I/B/E/S. FR is the median 
revision in earnings per share (EPS) for firm i in month t, scaled by 
the stock price of the firm. Price scaling is used to reduce 
measurement error in the forecasts (Christie (1987)). E(FR) is the 
“expected” revision in EPS for firm i in month t. The construction of 
E(FR) is outlined in Section II of the paper. AFR is calculated for 
seven timeframes: the next four quarters (including the current 
quarter) and three years (including the current year). “Quarter + 0” 
indicates the current financial quarter as of the forecast revision, 
“Quarter + 1” indicates the next financial quarter, and so on. 
After Law An indicator variable equal to one if the date of the observation is 
between June 2007 and the end of 2011 (and zero otherwise). 
Any Haven An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has at least one 
subsidiary incorporated in another tax haven country, as classified 




The market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities, all 
divided by the book value of assets (“atq”). Average Q is calculated 
using the following operations of Compustat data items:  (“atq” – 
“ceqq” + (“cshoq” * “prccq”)) / “atq”. In tests where Average Q < 1 
is also used as an explanatory variable, values of Average Q below 
one are set equal to one. 
Average Q < 1 An indicator variable equal to one if an observation’s Average Q (as 
defined above) is less than one. 
Cash/Assets Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets (Compustat data 
item “cheq” divided by “atq”) 
DebtRatio The sum of short-term debt (Compustat data item “sd”) and long 
term debt (“dlttq”) divided by total assets (“atq”). 
Decline An indicator variable equal to one when the two-month-lagged 
Smoothed U.S. Recession Probability is .10 or greater. Data on 





DivPayer An indicator variable equal to one if the one-quarter-lagged 
Div/Price ratio for a particular firm is greater than zero (and zero 
otherwise) 
AvgHistRevision The mean of all price-scaled median forecast revisions for a firm 
over its entire I/B/E/S listing period. 
Irish Likely An indicator variable equal to one if the firm has at least two 
subsidiaries incorporated in Ireland, one subsidiary incorporated in 
the Netherlands, and one subsidiary incorporated in another tax 
haven country, as classified by Desai et al. (2006) (and zero 
otherwise). 
LnAssets The natural log of firm assets (Compustat data item “atq”) 
%Sought The percentage of shares sought in an open market repurchase 
announcement. Obtained from the Securities Data Corporation’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
%Repurchased The percentage of actual shares repurchased (relative to total shares 
outstanding) through the first full quarter after an OMR 
announcement.  Calculated as Compustat item “cshopq” divided by 
“cshoq”. 
RankSize The percentile rank of firm i’s size in assets (Compustat data item 
“atq”) compared to all other Compustat-listed firms in a given 
quarter. The percentile rank is input into the regressions as its 
decimal equivalent (i.e. values between 0 and 1) in order to make the 
coefficient values more comparable to UpwardEPS. 
RE/TE Retained earnings (Compustat data item “req”) divided by total 
equity (Compustat data item “seqq”) 
Repurchaser An indicator variable equal to one if an OMR announcement occurs 





Operating income (Compustat data item “oibdpq”) divided by 
average assets less cash and cash equivalents (average of “atq” over 
the current quarter minus the average of “cheq” over the current 
quarter)). Cumulative matched changes in ROCAA for Table 9 are 
calculated as in the following example for the “qtr(+0) through 
qtr(+2)” measure: 1) Calculate the quarter-over-quarter “ROCAA 
change” for each repurchasing and matched observation for the 
OMR announcement quarter and  the next two quarters, 2) Calculate 
(ROCAA changerepurchaser)– (ROCAA changematch) for each pair of 
observations in each of the three quarters, 3) for each repurchasing 
firm, sum together the three quarterly “difference in differences” 
measures calculated in step 2, and 4) take the average of the sums 
calculated in step 3. 
ScaledCapEx The sum of all capital expenditures (Compustat data item “capxq”) 
over the prior four quarters divided by average assets less cash and 
cash equivalents (average of “atq” over the current quarter minus the 
70 
average of “cheq” over the current quarter)) over the prior four 
quarters. 
UpwardEPS The fraction of firm i’s year-over-year actual EPS changes over its 
I/B/E/S listing period that are EPS increases. The variable is 
designed to capture how often each firm is “growing” or “shrinking” 
EPS over the relevant reporting period; an UpwardEPS equal to 0.5 
indicates that a firm has an equal number of periods of EPS growth 
and EPS decline over its history. The EPS measure used is 
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